Which Reforms Work and under What Institutional Environment? Evidence from a New Data Set on Structural Reforms by Prati, Alessandro et al.
WHICH REFORMSWORK AND UNDERWHAT INSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENT? EVIDENCE FROM A NEW DATA SET ON
STRUCTURAL REFORMS
Alessandro Prati, Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato, and Chris Papageorgiou*
Abstract—Are structural reforms growth enhancing? Is the effectiveness of
reforms constrained by a country’s distance from the technology frontier or
by its institutional environment? This paper takes a new and comprehensive
look at these questions by employing a novel data set that includes sev-
eral kinds of real (trade, agriculture, and networks) and financial (domestic
finance, banking, securities, and capital account) reforms for an extensive
list of developed and developing countries, going back to the early 1970s.
First-pass evidence based on growth breaks analysis and on panel growth
regressions suggests that on average, both real and financial sector reforms
are positively associated with higher growth. However, on several occasions,
botched reforms resulted in growth disasters. More important, the positive
reform-growth relationship is shown to be highly heterogeneous and to be
influenced by a country’s constraints on the authority of the executive power
and by its distance from the technology frontier. Finally, there is some evi-
dence that crises, defined as severe growth downturns, are associated with
subsequent reform upticks.
I. Introduction
OVER the past few decades, many countries have expe-rienced remarkable progress in their economic perfor-
mance. This coincided with an unprecedented wave of struc-
tural reforms, including trade and financial liberalization.
Although there are many possible driving forces underlying
this phenomenon the apparent; comovement between growth
and a broad range of structural reforms deserves renewed
attention.1
Do reforms promote growth? Which reforms really work?
Do institutions supersede policies to explain economic per-
formance? Or does the institutional environment play a role in
how effective reforms are? These questions have been fiercely
debated among academics and policymakers for a long time,
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1 A reasonable concern is that the observed recent growth in resource-rich
developing countries is primarily due to hikes in oil and other commodities’
prices. However, it is still remarkable that growth has been so spectacular
in most regions and countries of the world, including non-resource-rich
countries.
with not much progress in arriving at a conclusive answer.2
Testimony to how contentious and divisive discussions have
been about the success and failure of certain reforms or pack-
ages of reforms is a voluminous literature that emerged by
advocates and critiques of the Washington consensus, a list
of policies originally proposed by John Williamson in 1990.3
Economic theory suggests that structural reforms should
remove obstacles to an efficient allocation of resources,
thereby increasing average income levels. At the same time,
a perennial challenge for policymakers is finding ways to
improve economic performance. This is difficult and complex
task, but there is general agreement that structural reforms—
such as reducing rigidities in product and factor markets,
liberalizing capital flows, and freeing international trade—
are an important part of an overall strategy for raising incomes
and sustaining economic growth. Despite the importance of
the issue, the analysis of the relevance of such policies in
terms of economic performance has been limited by the lack
of consistent historical data on reforms in many non-OECD
economies.
While much is still to be learned about the connection
between structural reforms and economic performance, sev-
eral insights emerge from existing research. First, a wide
body of empirical evidence documents that trade liberaliza-
tion raises the level of real income in an economy as a result of
improvements in efficiency.4 Furthermore, there seems to be a
presumption that trade liberalization also raises an economy’s
long-run growth rate. Sachs and Warner (1995), for instance,
construct a composite index of openness to international trade
2 Easterly (2005), for instance, studies the association between a large
set of economic policies and economic growth. Although baseline esti-
mates suggest that better policies lead to a substantial increase in per capita
income growth, once “extreme” cases of bad policies are removed from
the sample policy, variables no longer display any relevant association with
growth. Rodrik (2005) discusses how policies aimed at promoting eco-
nomic growth can be highly context specific. Recent literature investigates
whether institutions are more important than policies to explain country-
wide differences in economic performance. The evidence that Easterly and
Levine (2003) provide suggests that macroeconomic policies do not play
a big role in explaining current levels of economic development once the
effect of institutions is taken into account. They argue that bad policies
might be “symptoms” of a deeper institutional weakness. Acemoglu et al.
(2008) reach a similar conclusion.
3 Williamson (2000) coined the phrase in 1990 “to refer to the lowest
common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-
based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989.”
4 Frankel and Romer (1999) use country geographical characteristics as
instruments for trade shares. Their results suggest that a rise of 1% point in
the ratio of trade to GDP increases per capita income by 0.5%. Anderson,
Martin, and van Mensbrugghe (2006) estimate that the removal of all trade
barriers would raise real income of the world by about US$287 billion
in 2015. However, Tokarick (2008) points out that all countries may not
benefit, as some may face adverse movements in their terms of trade as a
result of trade liberalization.
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and find that in the period from 1970 to 1989 open economies
experienced an average growth 2.45 percentage points higher
than closed ones.5 Dollar and Kraay (2004) use decade-over-
decade variations in volume of trade as a proxy for change
in trade policy. Openness to international trade appears to
sustain higher income growth rates. Nevertheless, empiri-
cal research has not established a conclusive relationship
between trade liberalization and economic performance (see
Berg & Krueger, 2003, for a survey).6
A large body of literature suggests that a well-developed
financial sector promotes economic growth (Levine, 1997,
2005). However, relatively few studies try to assess the impact
of financial sector reforms on economic growth. Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad’s (2005) main measure of financial
liberalization is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years
when foreign investors can own equities of a particular mar-
ket. Equity market liberalization increases annual real per
capita GDP growth by almost 1%. Quinn and Toyoda (2008)
provide detailed de jure measures of capital account and
financial current account openness and document that capital
account liberalization is positively associated with growth.
Finally, recent empirical work provides evidence that struc-
tural reforms improve economic performance in advanced
economies. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) use an original
data set on product market regulation in eighteen OECD
countries and show that product market reforms raise pro-
ductivity growth. Evidence on the impact of these kinds of
structural reforms in emerging and developing economies
does not exist.
Motivated by this literature, we take a broad look at the
association between a wide range of structural reforms and
economic growth. Specifically, we employ a newly con-
structed data set that includes information about several
kinds of structural reforms in both the real and financial
sectors of the economy for both industrialized and devel-
oping countries over roughly the past thirty years. Indices of
structural reforms in the real sector of the economy measure,
respectively, the extent of openness to international trade, the
reduction of public intervention in the agricultural market,
and the degree of liberalization in the telecommunication
and electricity markets. Indicators of structural reforms in
the financial sector encompass the overall domestic finan-
cial sector and two more specific subsectors: the banking and
securities markets, respectively. A final set of indicators of
5 Sachs and Warner (1995) define a country open to international trade
if none of the following conditions holds: (a) nontariff barriers covering
40% or more of trade, (b) average tariff rates of 40% or more, (c) a black
market exchange rate depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official
exchange rate, (d) a socialist economic system, and (e) a state monopoly
on major exports. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) discuss in depth whether
the Sachs and Warner index provides an appropriate measure of openness
to international trade.
6 Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), following Frankel and Romer
(1999), instrument actual trade-to-GDP shares with those estimated on the
basis of gravity equations for bilateral trade flows. Settlers’ mortality rates
from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) are used as an instrument
for the quality of institutions. Their results suggest that institutions are the
main determinants of current differences in economic development.
financial sector reforms captures the degree of the external
capital account openness. The richness of our data, in terms of
both the sectors of the economy they refer to and of their time
and country coverage, is essential to empirically investigating
different hypotheses about the relationship between reforms
and growth that have been suggested by recent literature.
We rely on two approaches. First, we investigate the rela-
tionship between reforms and growth breaks. The hypothesis
that reforms cause growth accelerations is based on the obser-
vation that the output path in the advanced countries tends to
be fairly steady, while it is often characterized by “moun-
tains, cliffs, and plains” in developing economies (Pritchett,
2000). Growth breaks are broadly defined as extended peri-
ods of markedly high or slow growth. Hausmann, Pritchett,
and Rodrik (2005), Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), and
Jones and Olken (2008) use this approach to understand the
differential growth experiences of rich and poor countries. A
related question is whether economic crises initiate the pro-
cesses of structural reforms. An extensive literature tries to
test this hypothesis (see, for instance, Drazen and Easterly,
2001). One of our aims is to look at these issues by using the
growth breaks approach.
Second, we present estimates about the association
between the reform indicators and economic growth based
on panel data analysis that controls for country and time fixed
effects. We then move to an empirical assessment of the extent
to which country-wide key variables like the distance to the
technological frontier7 and the broad institutional environ-
ment,8 reinforce the impact of structural reforms on economic
performance. Finally, we provide an extensive analysis of the
robustness of our main results to the inclusion of additional
covariates, different time periods and income groups, and the
use of lower-frequency data.
Our main findings are as follows: growth breaks and
growth regression analyses provide evidence that both real
7 A line of research in economics, building on the Schumpeterian growth
paradigm (see, for instance, Aghion & Howitt, 2006), emphasizes that the
design of policies aimed at fostering economic growth is context specific
and depends on a country’s distance to the world technological frontier.
According to this theoretical framework, a proper empirical assessment of
the relevance of different pro-growth policies requires taking into account
the possibility for nonlinear effects arising from a country’s distance to the
technological frontier.
8 Acemoglu et al. (2008) also point to the possibility that policy reforms
may have nonlinear effects, which, in their view, are determined by the
degree of the institutional constraints imposed on politicians’ behavior.
More specifically, their theoretical analysis predicts that reforms have a
less relevant impact on economic outcomes in countries with high or low
levels of constraints on executive power. In the first case, politicians, who
are highly accountable and constrained in their power, are less likely to
implement, in the first instance, de facto distortionary policies. Therefore, de
jure reforms should have a less dramatic impact on economic outcomes. On
the other hand, in contexts characterized by weak mechanisms of political
accountability, de jure reforms can be easily (de facto) undermined and,
consequently, be of more limited impact. In countries with intermediate
levels of constraints on politicians, the institutions are not sound enough to
make bad economic policies rare, but at the same time they are not so weak
that de jure reforms can be easily disregarded. Under such circumstances,
the authors expect that policy reforms should be more effective at achieving
the goals they are designed for.
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and financial sector reforms are on average positively asso-
ciated with growth. Among real sector reforms, openness
to international trade and a lesser public intervention in the
agricultural market have a significant positive association
with growth, while reforms in the network industries (elec-
tricity and telecommunications) are not significant. Among
financial sector reforms, both domestic financial reforms and
capital account liberalization are significantly correlated with
higher growth. These conditional correlations exhibit sub-
stantial variation across reforms influenced by the distance
to the technological frontier and the level of a country’s
constraint on executive power and are heterogeneous across
different time periods and country income groups. It is also
shown that on several occasions, botched reforms resulted in
growth disasters. Finally, there is some evidence that severe
growth downturns are associated with subsequent reform
upticks. Numerous robustness checks show that the base-
line results hold up quite well to alternative specifications,
estimation method, and data frequency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the recently constructed structural reform
indices. Section III reports and discusses our main findings
concerning growth breaks and baseline regression analysis,
as well as the extent to which the distance to the technolog-
ical frontier and the quality of the institutions influence the
association between reforms and growth. Section IV presents
an extensive robustness analysis of the baseline results, and
Section V concludes.
II. A First Look at the Data
This section provides an introduction to the indices of
structural reforms we consider in the analysis and describes
their time patterns at the aggregate and regional level and by
grouping countries according to institutional quality.
The key advantage of our structural reform data over those
used in previous work is that they have a long time series
dimension (around thirty years) and comprise a large num-
ber of countries (over ninety countries), including advanced
and developing economies.9 The indicators of reforms in the
real sector of the economy regard openness to international
trade and product market liberalization. Openness to interna-
tional trade is measured along two dimensions: average tariff
rates and restrictions on current account transactions (includ-
ing payments and receipts on exports and imports of goods
and services), respectively. Two different indices capture the
degree of structural reforms undertaken in the product mar-
kets. The first refers to the agricultural sector. It measures the
extent of public intervention in the market of each country’s
9 For some reforms (trade, agriculture, networks, and current account),
the data go back to 1960 and cover more than 100 countries. The complete
list of the countries included in the sample and detailed information about
the methodology used to construct the different indicators (along with their
time and country coverage) are reported in appendixes 1 and 2, respectively
in the online supplement.
main agricultural export commodity. It includes the presence
of export marketing boards and the incidence of administered
prices. The second measures the degree of liberalization in
the telecommunications and electricity markets, including the
extent of competition in the provision of these services and
the existence of an independent regulator.
Among the indicators of financial sector reforms, the index
of domestic financial liberalization is derived from the data-
base constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008).
It is an average of six subindices. Five of them refer to the
banking system and cover (a) credit controls, such as subsi-
dized lending and directed credit; (b) interest rate controls,
such as floors or ceilings; (c) competition restrictions, such
as entry barriers and limits on branches; (d) the degree of
state ownership; and (e) the quality of banking supervision
and regulation. The sixth dimension relates to the securi-
ties markets and captures the degree of legal restrictions
on the development of domestic bonds and equity markets,
as well as the existence of independent regulators. When
investigating the association between reforms in the domes-
tic financial sector and economic growth, we use both the
overall index of domestic financial liberalization and the two
different subindices that relate to the banking and securities
sectors.
Another indicator of financial sector reforms is the index
of external capital account liberalization, which measures a
broad set of restrictions on financial transactions for residents
and nonresidents, as well as the use of multiple exchange
rates. In the empirical analysis, we use both this aggregate
measure and the two separate indicators of external capi-
tal account openness for resident and nonresident. The last
two subindices measure, respectively, the intensity of legal
restrictions on residents’ versus nonresidents’ ability to move
capital in and out the country.
All indicators are rescaled to range between 0 and 1, with
higher values corresponding to a greater degree of liberaliza-
tion. Differences in values of each index across countries and
over time provide useful information on the variation in the
absolute degree of economic liberalization within each sector.
Instead, differences in the value of the indices across sectors
do not provide a precise quantitative measure of whether one
sector is more liberalized than another because of the differ-
ent methodology used to construct each index. For instance, a
positive difference between the trade index and the financial
index does not necessarily mean that trade is more liberalized
than the financial sector.
As shown in figure 1, all six indices we consider (interna-
tional trade, current account, networks, agriculture, capital
account, and domestic finance) trend upward over time
toward a high degree of liberalization. The liberalization
of international trade, capital movements, and the domestic
financial sector has been fairly steady and gradual over the
past three decades, whereas product market reforms (agricul-
ture, electricity, and telecommunications) started only around
1990. There have been no global setbacks in the reforming
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Figure 1.—Structural Reforms Indices, All Countries
Source: IMF estimates.
Higher values of the indices denote a larger degree of structural reforms. Each index is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Their plotted values correspond to the mean of each index across countries in a given year.
“Agriculture” captures public intervention in the market for each country’s main agricultural export commodity. “Domestic finance” takes into account restrictions on the interest rate determination and the banking
sector’s competition, credit controls, and quality of supervision in the banking sector, as well as the degree of liberalization of securities markets. “Trade” denotes average tariff rates. “Capital account” is an indicator
of restrictions on financial credits and personal capital transactions for residents and financial credits for nonresidents. “Networks” captures the degree of competition and liberalization and the quality of regulation in
the electricity and telecommunications markets. “Current account” denotes current account restrictions on the proceeds from international trade in goods and services. See appendix 2 for more details.
process, in any sector. Structural reform indicators display
significant differences across regions (figure 2), pointing to
a process of catching up with the levels of sectorial reforms
that characterize the industrial economies.
Panels in Figure 3 depict the evolution over time of our
indices for countries grouped according to a specific measure
of quality of political institutions: the degree of constraints
on the executive power. This variable, taken from the Polity
IV project, ranges from 1, denoting no regular limitations on
the executive’s power, to 7, denoting countries where political
bodies such as legislatures have equal or even larger authority
than the executive (see Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2010).
Following Acemoglu et al. (2008), we classify the countries
into three categories of high, medium, and low constraints on
the executive.10
All measures of reforms show a broad upward trend over
time in the three groups of countries we consider; the only
less clear-cut cases are current and capital account open-
ness in countries with low constraints on the executive.
Notwithstanding substantial country-specific heterogeneity,
economies with better political institutions are generally
characterized by higher values of the reform indicators.
10 For each country we compute the sample mean of the variable con-
straints on the executive. Countries above, within, and below 1 standard
deviation from the sample mean are assigned, respectively, to the categories
of high, middle, and low constraints on the executive.
III. Estimation and Results
The empirical baseline analysis is organized around
four related parts. Section IIIA investigates the correlation
between the reform indices and growth spells, motivated by
the recent literature on growth accelerations (see Hausmann
et al., 2005). Section IIIB investigates the association between
reforms and trend growth based on OLS regressions that con-
trol for country and time fixed effects. Sections IIIC and IIID
examine to what extent the reforms-growth relationship is
influenced by a country’s distance from the technological
frontier and by the institutional environment, respectively.
A. Reforms and Growth Spells
In this section we present evidence from graphical anal-
ysis about the association between different types of real
and financial structural reforms and growth spells. Growth
spells, broadly defined as extended periods of very rapid or
markedly slow growth, are a striking feature of the devel-
opment process in many countries. Hausmann et al. (2005),
Berg et al. (2012), and Jones and Olken (2008) rely on this
new approach to the data analysis to understand the different
growth experiences of rich and poor countries.11 This section
11 Two early precursors of the current work on growth spells are Ben-
David and Papell (1998) and Pritchett (2000), both of which employ novel
econometric methods to identify shifts in growth performance.
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Figure 2.—Structural Reform Indices by Region
Source: IMF estimates.
Higher values of the indices denote a larger degree of structural reforms. Each index is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Their plotted values correspond to the mean of each index across countries in a given
year. “Trade” denotes average tariff rates. “Current account” denotes current account restrictions on the proceeds from international trade in goods and services. “Networks” captures the degree of competition and
liberalization and the quality of regulation in the electricity and telecommunications markets. “Agriculture” captures public intervention in the market for each country’s main agricultural export commodity. “Capital
Account” is an indicator of restrictions on financial credits and personal capital transactions for residents and financial credits for nonresidents. “Domestic finance” takes into account restrictions on the interest rate
determination and the banking sector’s competition, credit controls, and quality of supervision in the banking sector, as well as the degree of liberalization of securities markets. See appendix 2 for more details.
uses a set of growth spells identified by using the econometric
methodology of Berg et al. (2012) to examine whether struc-
tural reforms accompany growth accelerations and whether
reform reversals or the absence of reforms are associated
with growth decelerations. Berg et al.’s methodology modi-
fies the procedure first developed by Bai and Perron (1998)
to determine sample-specific critical values for testing the
presence of multiple structural breaks in a time series when
both the total number and the location of breaks is unknown.
Berg et al.’s procedure differs from Bai and Perron’s approach
in that it uses sample-specific critical values adjusted for the
presence of heteroskedasticity and for small sample size. The
last feature of this procedure is of particular relevance for our
analysis, which is based on a data set with a time dimension
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Figure 3.—Structural Reforms Indices by Constraint to the Executive Level
Source: Marshall et al. (2010) and authors’ estimates.
Higher values of the indices denote a larger degree of structural reforms. Each index is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Their plotted values correspond to the mean of each index across countries in a given
year. “Trade” denotes average tariff rates. “Current account” denotes current account restrictions on the proceeds from international trade in goods and services. “Networks” captures the degree of competition and
liberalization and the quality of regulation in the electricity and telecommunications markets. “Agriculture” captures public intervention in the market for each country’s main agricultural export commodity. “Capital
account” is an indicator of restrictions on financial credits and personal capital transactions for residents and financial credits for nonresidents. “Domestic finance” takes into account restrictions on the interest rate
determination and the banking sector’s competition, credit controls, and quality of supervision in the banking sector, as well as the degree of liberalization of securities markets. See appendix 2 for more details.
of about thirty years.12 (Appendix 3 lists all the episodes of
up and down breaks in economic growth since 1960 that are
detected by using this statistical methodology.)
Figures 4 and 5 plot the average level of the residuals,
obtained through a panel regression of each index on country
and year fixed effects, for a period starting five years before
12 Antoshin, Berg, and Souto (2008) provide a detailed description of these
extensions and document how they improve both the power and the size
properties of the test in applications with a small number of observations.
a structural break in growth (denoted as 0 on the horizon-
tal axis) and ending five years after it. The set of countries
we rely on to plot the different graphs of figures 4 and 5
comprises those economies for which each sectoral reform
index is available with continuity in the period starting three
years before a break. In this manner, graphs of each indicator
of structural reforms are drawn by using the same group of
countries. The solid line depicts the evolution over time of
each index’s average residuals for countries that experience
an up-break in economic growth, the dashed line for countries
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Figure 4.—Growth Breaks and Real Sector Reforms
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2.
The figures plot the (average) residuals of the reform indicators for a five-year period before and after the year of a break in economic growth, normalized to 0 on the horizontal axis. Residuals of the indices
are obtained by regressing each index on country fixed effects (to remove country averages) and year fixed effects (to remove common trends). The solid line plots average residuals of the indices for countries that
experience up-breaks in growth, the dashed one for countries that experience down-breaks in growth.
that have a down-break in economic growth. Given that panel
regressions remove country- and year-specific averages of
each index, a movement of the plotted average residual from
below to above the 0 reference line on the vertical axis prior to
an up-break (for example, in the case of the current account
index, the solid line of the middle panel in figure 4) indi-
cates that the reform index has gone from below the country
average to above the country average prior to an up-break.
The year-specific fixed effects effectively remove the global
trend in each index so that, in practice, the country specific
averages relative to which the plotted residuals are measured
are trend-corrected. This means that the decline of the plotted
residual lines around down-breaks (for example, in the case
of the agriculture index, dashed line of bottom panel in figure
4) can indicate either reform reversals or lack of reform in a
period when many other countries are reforming.13
13 In figure 4, there is no chart for networks reform because of the few
spells available after 1990.
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Figure 5.—Growth Breaks and Financial Sector Reforms
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2.
The figures plot the (average) residuals of the reform indicators for a five-year period before and after the year of a break in economic growth, normalized to 0 on the horizontal axis. Residuals of the indices
are obtained by regressing each index on country fixed effects (to remove country averages) and year fixed effects (to remove common trends). The solid line plots average residuals of the indices for countries that
experience up-breaks in growth, the dashed one for countries that experience down-breaks in growth.
Among real-sector reforms (figure 4), liberalization of the
current account and the agriculture sector are clearly associ-
ated with growth accelerations, with the indices improving
about three years before the up-break and continuing on an
upward trend afterward. Conversely, growth decelerations
are associated with a tariff-based trade liberalization index
below the country average (the 0 reference line for the vertical
axis) and with deteriorating indices of current account lib-
eralization and agriculture. Among financial sector reforms
(figure 5), liberalization of the domestic financial sector and
of the capital account is associated with growth acceler-
ations. The banking component of the domestic financial
sector index starts improving about two years before an up-
break. As in the case of most real sector indices, growth
decelerations are associated with a downward trend of all
financial indices, which tends to begin around the time
of occurrence of the down-break and markedly continues
afterward.
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Figure 6.—Reforms in the Real Sector and Growth Performance
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2.
The figures plot the average per capita GDP growth (dashed line) and the average reform index (solid
line) during a five-year period before and after the year of an up-break in each reform index (0 on the
horizontal axis).
Plotting the reform indices’ average residuals around the
time of an up-break in growth allows for a preliminary anal-
ysis of whether sustained periods of economic growth are
associated with an increase in the different indices of secto-
rial reforms we consider. As a further step, we are interested in
understanding more about the average growth pattern around
the time a sharp increase in each index of structural reforms
occurs. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the average path of per
capita GDP growth five years before and after an up-break
in the reform indices, denoted as 0 on the horizontal axis
of the graphs. The idea here is to see to what extent per
capita GDP growth is associated with the main episodes
of structural reforms that we are able to detect by using
Berg et al.’s methodology. Among real sector reforms (figure
6), GDP growth shows a visible, albeit weak, trending up
after substantial reforms of the current account and of the
agricultural sector, while there is no such relation between
growth and trade reforms. The association between growth
and large financial reforms (especially banking) is much
stronger, as shown in figure 7. Interestingly, these observa-
tions are qualitatively consistent with those in the previous
exercise.
Figure 7.—Reforms in the Financial Sector and Growth Performance
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2.
The figures plot the average per capita GDP growth (dashed line) and the average reform index (solid
line) during a five-year period before and after the year of an up-break in reform (0 on the horizontal axis).
So far we have shown how different reforms are associated
with the average per capita GDP growth. Obviously, looking
only at the average per capita growth may not be fully satisfac-
tory as long as some processes of reforms can be misguided,
mistimed, or simply poorly implemented. Figures 8 and 9
show evidence on how some real and financial sector liber-
alization attempts resulted in devastating growth outcomes
with economies contracting at the rate of 5% or more per
year. For instance, in the top panel of figure 8 on trade liber-
alization, ZIM88 indicates that two years after Zimbabwe’s
major reform steps to reduce tariffs in 1988, there was a
sharp growth decline (annual per capita GDP growth declined
around 12%). Also, the bottom panel of figure 8 shows that
three years after main reforms in the agricultural market,
countries in South America, such as Argentina in the late
1970s, Brazil in the late 1980s, and Mexico in the early
1990s, experienced major growth downturns. Several sub-
Saharan African countries went through a similar experience
(for instance, Cameroon and Ethiopia in the early 1990s, and
Malawi in the mid-1980s).
Under financial sector reforms, in the top panel of figure
9 on domestic finance liberalization, MOZ93 indicates that
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Figure 8.—Liberalization Failures in the Real Sector
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2, and Marshall et al. (2010).
The figures plot negative growth experiences (worse than −5 percent) from failed real reforms. For
example in the top panel on trade liberalization, ZIM88 indicates that two years after Zimbabwe’s major
reform to reduce tariffs in 1988, there was a major growth downturn (annual per capita GDP declined
by around 12%). The symbols next to the country names denote the level of constraints on the executive
power from the Polity IV Project (2010) as follows: diamond (fourth quartile—highest institutional quality),
triangle (third quartile), circle (second quartile), and square (first quartile—lowest institutional quality).
three years after Mozambique’s major reform steps to liberal-
ize banking and securities market sectors in 1993, there was
a drastic growth decline (annual per capita GDP declined by
20%). The main message from this exercise is that we can
detect, across all reform indices, several cases in which the
process of reforming sectors of the economy worked poorly.14
Also, substantial reforms undertaken in the banking sector by
several low-income countries, (middle panel of figure 9), such
14 Similar figures showing how reform up-breaks are associated with
growth success stories (namely, per capita growth over 5%) are available
on request from the authors.
Figure 9.—Liberalization Failures in the Financial Sector
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2, and Marshall et al. (2010).
The figures plot negative growth experiences (worse than −5 percent) from failed financial reforms.
For example, in the top panel, on domestic finance liberalization, MOZ93 indicates that three years after
Mozambique’s major reform in 1993 to liberalize banking and securities markets sectors, there was a major
growth downturn (annual per capita GDP declined by 20%). The symbols next to the country names denote
the level of constraints on the executive power from the Polity IV Project (2010) as follows: diamond (fourth
quartile—highest institutional quality), triangle (third quartile), circle (second quartile), and square (first
quartile—lowest institutional quality).
as Mauritanian, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe around 1990,
were followed by devastating growth decelerations.
This evidence triggers the question, Why do potentially
beneficial reforms turn into growth disasters? To take a first
look at this question, we assign to each country name in
figures 8 and 9 a symbol that denotes the level of institutional
quality using the Polity IV index. We show that countries
with a lower quality of institutions are more likely to experi-
ence growth failures after undertaking reforms. (It would be
interesting to undertake a more careful and in-depth analy-
sis of these results, perhaps focusing on country case studies
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Figure 10.—Crises and Reform Upticks
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Penn World Tables, version 6.2.
The figure plots real and financial reform upticks following economic crises defined as growth down-breaks (severe and sustained growth decelerations).
and looking into these reform disasters, but this is beyond the
scope of this paper).
Last but not least, we extend our analysis to consider the
hypothesis that economic crises could lead to the adoption
of structural reforms. That is, deteriorating economic con-
ditions may facilitate major changes in economic policies
(see, among the others, Drazen, 2000, and Drazen & East-
erly, 2001). This could be analyzed directly here by looking
at whether growth down-breaks stimulate subsequent liberal-
izations upticks. Figure 10 shows some evidence in favor of
the crisis-reforms hypothesis where major reform attempts
emerge a few years after a growth collapse. In the real sector,
several cases of trade and current account reforms emerged
after a growth collapse. The same is observed for domestic
finance, and specifically banking reforms, albeit with some
lag.
B. Reforms and Growth Trends: Baseline Regressions
In this section we provide econometric evidence based on
growth regressions about the relationship between structural
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Table 1.—Baseline Growth Regressions
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.019∗
(0.010)
Current account (t−1) 0.033∗∗∗
(0.008)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.018∗∗
(0.008)
Network (t−1) 0.004
(0.009)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.064∗∗∗
(0.014)
Banking (t−1) 0.050∗∗∗
(0.012)
Securities (t−1) 0.037∗∗∗
(0.008)
Capital (t−1) 0.021∗∗
(0.009)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.015∗∗
(0.007)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.016∗
(0.008)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.048∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 3,418 3,530 3,390 3,796 2,653 2,653 2,653 3,530 3,556 3,530
R2 0.194 0.141 0.169 0.148 0.199 0.194 0.196 0.139 0.137 0.138
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
reforms and economic growth. We estimate through ordinary
least squares (OLS) the following specification:
ln GDPi,t − ln GDPi,t−1 = a0 + a1 ln GDPi,t−1
+ a2Reformi,t−1 + ηi + δt + εit , (1)
in which the per capita GDP growth in country i at period t
is regressed on the log of a one-year lag of per capita GDP
and a one-year lag of each indicator of structural reforms
(Reformi,t−1). A full set of country and year fixed effects
denoted by the terms ηi and δt , respectively, is included in
the model; εit represents the error term. By including coun-
try fixed effects, we control for any country time-invariant
characteristic (such as geographical location, historical lega-
cies, and legal origins) that could affect both the adoption
of structural reforms and per capita income growth. Baseline
estimates are obtained by using yearly data for the period
1973 to 2006.15
Estimates from baseline specification (1) are reported in
table 1. With the exception of reforms in the electricity and
telecommunications markets (network) the coefficient esti-
mates of all the remaining indices of structural reforms are
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.
As it concerns reforms of the real sectors of the economy, the
coefficient estimate for the current account has the largest
15 Although data for some indicators of structural reforms go back to the
1960s, we chose to base our estimation on data starting from 1973, given
their better quality.
magnitude and is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The coefficients of international trade and agricultural mar-
ket reforms have a smaller magnitude and are statistically
significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The over-
all indicator of reforms of the domestic financial market (the
composite index of six financial sectors’ subindices) shows
the largest positive coefficient magnitude and is also pre-
cisely estimated. Reforms of the banking and security sectors
also show positive and statistically significant coefficient esti-
mates, with the coefficient magnitude of the second variable
being smaller than the first one. The coefficient estimates of
the three indices of the external capital account openness are
also positive and statistically significant, though smaller in
magnitude and less precisely estimated than the ones per-
taining to the domestic financial sector. It may be surprising
that the electricity and telecommunications markets do not
show a positive association with growth, but as subsequent
robustness analysis shows, this result is driven by the fact that
network reforms have started much later than other reforms
(figure 1 shows that the relevant index is close to 0 from 1973
to the end of the 1980s before showing a steep and almost
linear trend for the later period).
To gauge the size of the estimated correlation between
structural reforms and an increase in per capita income, we
focus on long-term multipliers, which take into account the
different dynamics of each reform and make their association
with growth comparable across the different kinds of reforms.
Specifically, a full liberalization of the current account, which
corresponds to a discrete jump of its index from the minimum
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of 0 to the maximum of 1, is associated with an estimated
increase of the output per capita by almost 65% in the long
run. The largest estimated coefficient refers to the reform of
the domestic financial market: a discrete jump of this indica-
tor from 0 would more than double output per capita in the
long run.16
It is also interesting to note that although the “breaks”
analysis of the previous section is concerned with average
spells rather than average estimated coefficients obtained by
the current regression analysis, results from the two exer-
cises are broadly consistent, showing positive associations
between current account and domestic financial reforms and
growth.
Motivated by recent contributions to the literature, we
examine possible heterogeneity of the association between
reforms and growth in two dimensions: the distance from the
technological frontier and the quality of institutions.
C. Reforms; Distance from the Technological Frontier and
Growth
An alternative to the standard neoclassical growth model
is the Schumpeterian growth theory, which emphasizes the
process of creative destruction.17 A key implication of the
literature motivated by this approach is that the process of
economic development is influenced by a country’s income
difference from that of the countries at the world technol-
ogy frontier. One of the most relevant questions in this
literature is how quickly low-income countries can close
their income gap with the economies at the technological
frontier. The distance from the frontier therefore becomes
a key economic dimension according to which policies
aimed at fostering economic growth should be designed and
implemented.
As stressed, for instance, in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zili-
botti (2006), the main cause of growth for economies far
from the technological frontier is the adoption of already
existing technologies. As a country approaches the tech-
nological frontier, the main force behind the process of
economic growth becomes innovation. According to these
authors, the design of specific pro-growth policies should
critically take into consideration the different stages of eco-
nomic development in different countries. Aghion and Howitt
(2006) analyze in depth the case of education, arguing that
primary and secondary education matters more for a coun-
try’s ability to imitate existing technologies, while tertiary
16 The inverse of (minus) the coefficient of the log of a one-year lag of per
capita GDP is the term by which the estimated coefficient of each indicator
of reforms is multiplied to obtain the long-run association between a discrete
jump of each index of reforms from 0 to 1 and the increase in per capita
income.
17 The process of creative destruction was pioneered in the writings of
Joseph Schumpeter (1928, 1942) and refers to the endogenous introduction
of new products and processes that inevitably eliminates some of the existing
products and processes. Schumpeterian growth theory has been revived and
formally modeled by Aghion and Howitt (1992).
education is more important for a country’s ability to inno-
vate.18 As countries catch up with the technology frontier,
tertiary education should be more relevant for growth than
primary and secondary education.19 In complementary work,
Aghion et al. (2009) show that close to the technological
frontier in addition to the education level, product market
rigidities and employment protection legislation would be
significantly related to TFP growth.
To test whether the association between reforms and
growth nonlinearly depends on the distance to the technol-
ogy frontier, we group the countries in our sample in quartiles
according to this dimension. Specifically, we use the ratio of
each country’s per capita GDP to that of the United States
as a proxy for its distance to the technology frontier in a
given year. For each country we then compute the average
distance to the frontier over the years in our sample, accord-
ing to which economies are assigned to different quartiles.
For each quartile, we estimate an econometric model simi-
lar to equation (1). The only difference is that we include a
one-year lag of the ratio of each country’s per capita GDP to
that of the United States instead of a one-year lag of the log
of per capita income. Consistent with the existing literature,
this is done to account for the process of convergence to the
technology frontier. As in the previous section, one indicator
of reform per time is included in the specification.
Our findings are summarized in table 2, which is orga-
nized as follows. In each of columns 1 to 10, we report the
coefficients and the standard errors (clustered at the coun-
try level) estimated for each indicator of reforms across the
different quartiles. The bottom row reports the p-value of
the test of the equality of the coefficient estimates across the
different quartiles. We find no evidence of a significant asso-
ciation between reforms and growth for countries in the first
quartile (countries most distant from the technology fron-
tier). With the exception of openness to international trade
(as measured by the average tariff rates) and reforms in the
networks sector, all the remaining indices display instead a
statistically significant and positive coefficient estimate in
the second quartile. The domestic financial sector and the
banking sector maintain a positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient estimate, also in the third quartile. Current
account and securities market reforms display an interesting
nonlinear correlation with economic growth. Their estimated
18 The analysis of education policies in Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2006)
is based also on work by Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) and
Aghion et al. (2005).
19 Aghion and Howitt (2006) combine insights from Nelson and Phelps
(1966) and Acemoglu et al. (2006). Nelson and Phelps model an economy
where productivity growth is a function of domestic human capital and
the distance from the frontier technology growing over time at an exoge-
nous rate. A higher stock of human capital fosters growth by facilitating
the catching up with the technological frontier. Similar to Acemoglu et al.
(2006), Aghion and Howitt (2006) show that productivity growth can be
generated by imitating existing technology or by innovating. The relative
importance of innovation increases as a country gets closer to the techno-
logical frontier. Moreover, investing in higher education should produce
a larger effect on a country’s ability to produce leading-edge innovation,
while investing in primary and secondary education should exert a larger
impact on a country’s ability to implement existing technologies.
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Table 2.—Reforms and Growth by Quartile of Distance to the Technological Frontier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trade Current Agriculture Network Domestic Banking Securities Capital Capital Capital
Account Finance (resident) (nonresident)
First quartile 0.041 0.028 0.010 0.025 0.026 0.017 0.030 0.006 0.016 −0.008
(0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.044) (0.040) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
Second quartile 0.027 0.054∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.006 0.109∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Third quartile −0.005 −0.003 0.007 0.008 0.114∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.030 −0.004 0.002 −0.009
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
Fourth quartile 0.024 0.037∗∗ 0.000 0.003 0.004 −0.005 0.019∗∗ 0.032 0.024 0.028∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Test equation coefficient 0.3609 0.0537 0.3444 0.8620 0.0004 0.0003 0.0845 0.1660 0.5131 0.1185
( p-value)
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the country level (in parentheses) are obtained for each quartile by OLS estimates of an equation in which each country’s growth rate of per capita GDP at time t
is regressed on one-year lag of each indicator of reforms per time and on one-year lag of the ratio of each country’s per capita GDP to that of the United States. All specifications include country and year fixed effects.
The p-value of the test of equality of the coefficient estimates across quartiles is reported in the bottom row of the table. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms and PPP adjusted. Significant at
*10%, **5%, and ***1%.
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at conven-
tional levels also in the fourth quartile, even if the magnitude
of the coefficients is smaller compared to the second quartile.
The coefficient estimates for current account and domestic
financial reform (and its banking and securities subcompo-
nents) are statistically different from each other across the
different quartiles. Finally, the positive coefficient estimate
of capital account openness for nonresidents is also statis-
tically significant in the fourth quartile (countries closest
to the technology frontier). Its coefficient estimates never-
theless are not statistically different from each other across
quartiles.
The lack of a significant association between reforms and
growth for countries most distant from the technology fron-
tier (first quartile) may be explained by considering that these
economies are likely to have a poor institutional environment,
in which case we find scattered evidence about the relevance
of reforms for growth (for details, see the next section). On the
other hand, that reduction of restrictions on current account
reforms and policies that encourage the formation of bonds
and securities’ markets have a significant association with
growth for countries closest to the frontier (fourth quartile),
and is suggestive of the idea that they may favor innovation-
led growth through openness to international competition
and the availability of financial instruments useful for financ-
ing the innovation process (consistent with Aghion, Howitt,
& Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). Perhaps more interesting are the
results for countries neither too far from nor too close to the
frontier (second and third quartiles). Several reforms, and
specifically those of the domestic financial market, seem to
work better in countries fighting their way toward the status
of emerging or even advanced economies. Relaxing market
constraints through reforms of the domestic financial market
and of the banking sectors may be more valuable in countries
that could benefit the most from large increases in private
credit and investment. In such developing economies, domes-
tic financial reforms can facilitate the transfer and financing
of existing technologies, contributing to a higher TFP and
growth.
D. Reforms: Institutions and Growth
In this section we examine whether a country’s broad
institutional environment affects the way in which reforms
promote growth. On the basis of recent literature, we focus
on two possible relevant dimensions of the institutional
environment. First, we consider the quality of the political
institutions, as captured by the degree of constraints imposed
on the executive power. Acemoglu et al. (2008) suggest that
reforms can be expected to be more effective in countries
characterized by an intermediate level of constraints on the
executive power. Second, on the basis of the findings of
Acemoglu et al. (2001), we investigate whether the aver-
age protection against the risk of expropriation influences
the extent to which structural reforms matter for a country’s
economic performance.
To test whether the association between reforms and
growth is heterogeneous across each of these two institutional
dimensions, we adopt an approach similar to the previous
section. We compute each country’s average level of con-
straints on the executive power (taken from the Polity IV
project) over the years in our sample and, according to this
dimension, assign the countries in our sample to different
quartiles.20 We also group the countries in our sample in a
second set of quartiles by using the variable that measures the
average protection against expropriation risk from Acemoglu
et al. (2001).21 The regression specification used is the same
as in equation (1) that now incorporates these institutional
measures across different quartiles.
20 See Marshall et al. (2010). This variable assumes values that range
from 1, when there are no regular limitations on the executive power, to 7,
when other political bodies have equal or more power than the executive. It
assumes also values of −88, −77, −66, which denote, respectively, periods
of transition, interregnum, and interruption. We turn such values to missing
when computing the sample mean of the constraints on the executive power.
21 As Acemoglu et al. (2001, p. 1397) explain, this variable, originally
elaborated by the Political Risk Services, measures the “risk of expropria-
tion of private foreign investment by government.” It takes values from 0 to
10, with higher values denoting a lower risk of being expropriated, and for
each country is constructed as the average value over the years 1985 to 1995.
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Table 3.—Reforms and Growth by Quartile of Constraints on the Executive Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trade Current Agriculture Network Domestic Banking Securities Capital Capital Capital
Account Finance (resident) (nonresident)
First quartile 0.051∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.010 −0.026 0.125 0.090 0.055 0.041 0.024 0.036
(0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.047) (0.091) (0.070) (0.051) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
Second quartile 0.011 0.024 0.024 −0.041 0.096∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.041∗ −0.010 −0.002 −0.015
(0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019)
Thrid quartile 0.022 0.019∗ 0.020 0.033∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.020 0.016 0.015
(0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Fourth quartile 0.001 0.020 0.021 −0.002 0.023 0.009 0.031∗∗∗ 0.017 0.009 0.018
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Test equation coefficient 0.3507 0.2966 0.9808 0.0934 0.0704 0.0434 0.9358 0.3801 0.6675 0.3652
( p-value)
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, Marshall et al. (2010), and authors’ estimates.
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at country level (in parentheses) are obtained for each quartile by OLS estimates of an equation in which each country’s growth rate of per capita GDP at time t is
regressed on one-year lag of each indicator of reforms per time and on one-year lag of the log of per capita GDP. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. The p-value of the test of equality of the
coefficient estimates across quartiles is reported in the bottom row of the table. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 4.—Reforms and Growth by Quartile of Average Protection Against Risk of Expropriation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trade Current Agriculture Network Domestic Banking Securities Capital Capital Capital
Account Finance (resident) (nonresident)
First quartile 0.038 0.041 0.011 0.035 −0.021 −0.025 0.019 0.038∗ 0.025 0.034∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.013) (0.023) (0.043) (0.038) (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Second quartile 0.019 0.024 0.014 −0.003 0.046 0.041 0.010 −0.026 −0.013 −0.024
(0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018)
Thrid quartile −0.002 0.030∗∗ −0.010 0.017 0.069∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.025
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
Fourth quartile 0.047∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.004 0.001 0.021 0.011 0.022∗ 0.022∗ 0.018∗ 0.015
(0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
Test equation coefficient 0.1400 0.9420 0.2913 0.5037 0.1151 0.1072 0.5913 0.0148 0.0920 0.0933
(p-value)
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, Acemoglu et al. (2001), and authors’ estimates.
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at country level (in parentheses) are obtained for each quartile by OLS estimates of an equation in which each country’s growth rate of per capita GDP at time t is
regressed on one-year lag of each indicator of reforms per time and on one-year lag of the log of per capita GDP. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. The p-value of the test of equality of the
coefficient estimates across quartiles is reported in the bottom row of the table. Annual data over 1973 to 2006 when available. GDP in real terms and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Results are summarized in tables 3 and 4 for constraints on
the executive and average risk of expropriation, respectively.
The tables are organized in the same manner as in table 2,
reporting in each column different indicators of structural
reform coefficients and their standard errors, estimated across
different quartiles.
The main finding here is that a positive and statistically sig-
nificant association between reforms and growth comes from
the third and, partially, the second quartiles (table 3). Esti-
mates for the first quartile show that only the two measures
of international trade openness are associated with higher
growth at a statistically significant level. Reforms for the
domestic financial market and its banking subcomponent are
positively associated with growth at a statistically signifi-
cant level only in the second and third quartiles. In addition,
their coefficient estimates are statistically different from each
other across quartiles. Reforms of the securities markets dis-
play a statistically significant and positive coefficient in the
second, third, and fourth quartiles, even though the coeffi-
cient estimates are not statistically different from each other
across quartiles. Finally, current account and network reforms
are associated at conventional statistical levels with higher
growth for countries in the third quartile. Only for the network
sector do the estimated coefficients differ from each other
across quartiles.22
With regard to the average risk of expropriation, estimates
reported in table 4 show a positive and statistically signifi-
cant association between reforms and growth coming mainly
from the third quartile (specifically, for reforms of the current
account, domestic financial sector, and its two subcompo-
nents, external capital account, and subindex for residents)
and the fourth one (in particular, for openness to interna-
tional trade, securities market, external capital account and its
subindex for resident). In the first quartile, only openness of
the external capital account and its index for nonresident are
positively associated with growth, at conventional statistical
levels. Finally, it is worth noting that only reforms concerning
the external capital accounts as captured by all three indices
22 We also performed the same exercise by grouping countries in different
quartiles according to the quality of democratic institutions as measured by
the variable polity2 from the Polity IV project. The evidence of a significant
and positive association between reforms and growth comes mainly from
countries in the third quartile, even though coefficient estimates (with the
exception for reforms in the banking sector) are not statistically different
from each other across quartiles. To save space, we do not report these
results, which are available on request from the authors.
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Table 5.—Reforms and Growth: Arellano-Bond GMM
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.031
(0.020)
Current account (t−1) 0.054∗∗
(0.023)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.055∗∗
(0.022)
Network (t−1) 0.001
(0.029)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.116∗∗∗
(0.025)
Banking (t−1) 0.095∗∗∗
(0.022)
Securities (t−1) 0.070∗∗∗
(0.016)
Capital (t−1) 0.037
(0.025)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.034∗
(0.019)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.024
(0.023)
lnGDP (t−1) 0.913∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Test second-order serial 0.180 0.205 0.438 0.186 0.796 0.816 0.752 0.216 0.210 0.210
correlation ( p-value)
Sargan test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 3,264 3,411 3,267 3,665 2,562 2,562 2,562 3,411 3,436 3,411
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by GMM (Arellano and Bond) and include year fixed effects. Two and more year lags of the log of per capita GDP are used as instruments.
Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
at hand have coefficient estimates that statistically differ from
each other across quartiles.
IV. Robustness
In this section we perform several econometric exercises to
examine the robustness of the findings discussed in section
IIIB. We first check whether our results hold when using
the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
We then include a set of time-varying control variables and
investigate whether our baseline estimates are heterogeneous
across different time periods and income groups. We also
estimate equation (1) by using lower-frequency data. Finally,
we include in the baseline econometric model of section IIIB
several indicators of structural reforms at the same time to
check for a possible relevant source of omitted variable bias.
A. Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation
Through a simple manipulation, we can write equation (1)
as
ln GDPi,t = a0 + a¯1 ln GDPi,t−1 + a2Reformi,t−1
+ ηi + δt + εit , (2)
where a¯1 = 1 + a1. Equation (1) is rearranged as a dynamic
model in which the lagged dependent variable is included
among the regressors (see Caselli, Esquivel, & Lefort, 1996).
Fixed-effect OLS estimates are therefore inconsistent due to
the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
lagged error term. For fixed N , OLS estimates are consistent
only for T → ∞. Although the number of time periods in our
data set is not too small, fixed-effect OLS estimates can still
be inconsistent if the process for per capita income is persis-
tent (see Wooldridge, 2002). To deal with this issue, we use
the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
which takes the first differences of equation (2) in order to
remove country-specific unobserved heterogeneity and uses
two or more lags of the dependent variable as instruments.
Table 5 reports results from GMM estimation. By com-
paring these results with those in table 1, we note that the
positive association between growth and openness to inter-
national trade as captured by the average tariff rates no
longer holds, while the coefficient estimate of the variable
measuring the lack of restrictions on current account trans-
actions remains a positive and statistically significant. The
estimates confirm the positive association between the lib-
eralization of the agricultural market and growth, while the
degree of liberalization in the network and electricity mar-
kets remains a statistically insignificant correlation with a
country’s economic performance.
Results for reforms in the financial sector are somewhat
mixed compared to those reported in table 1. Specifically,
the overall index of the domestic financial sector reform and
its two subcomponents for banking and securities is associ-
ated with a higher rate of economic growth at a statistically
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Table 6.—Baseline Growth Regressions with Controls
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.021∗
(0.013)
Current account (t−1) 0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.024∗∗∗
(0.009)
Network (t−1) −0.009
(0.012)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.060∗∗∗
(0.015)
Banking (t−1) 0.046∗∗∗
(0.014)
Securities (t−1) 0.035∗∗∗
(0.009)
Capital (t−1) 0.022∗∗
(0.010)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.017∗∗
(0.007)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.016
(0.011)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.057∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy (t−1) −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Terms of trade (t−1) 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary enroll (t−1) 0.033∗ 0.025 0.041∗ 0.034 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.017 0.022 0.018
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 2,460 2,580 2,402 2,584 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,580 2,583 2,580
R2 0.180 0.164 0.189 0.172 0.184 0.180 0.183 0.161 0.159 0.160
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, authors’ estimates, International Financial Statistics, Marshall et al. (2010), and World Development Indicators.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
significant level. Among the indicators of capital account lib-
eralization, only the one measuring the lack of restrictions
imposed on residents maintains a statistically significant and
positive coefficient estimate.
The p-values reported at the bottom of table 5 show that
there is no statistically significant second-order serial corre-
lation among the first-differenced error terms (an assumption
required for the consistency of the estimates). Yet the Sargan
test rejects, for all the specifications, the null hypothesis that
the overidentifying assumptions are valid, which leads us to
take these results with a word of caution.
B. Additional Robustness Checks
Next, we start assessing the robustness of our results to the
inclusion in equation (1) of an additional set of time-varying
control variables. Table 6 extends the results of table 1 by
adding a one-year lag of three additional covariates: political
institutions (as measured by the polity2 indicator of quality
of democracy from the Polity IV project), terms of trade,
and tertiary educational attainment. Our results are broadly
robust to the inclusion of this set of variables. In comparison
to the results reported in table 1, the index of liberalization
of the capital account for nonresident is the only one to lose
statistical significance. The sign of the coefficient estimate for
the reforms in the electricity and telecommunication markets
turns out to be negative but is still not statistically different
from 0.23
We then investigate whether the empirical evidence about
reforms and growth reported in table 1 is heterogeneous
across different time periods. For instance, Billmeier and
Nannicini (forthcoming), by using a different estimation
method from ours, find evidence of a positive effect of eco-
nomic liberalizations on growth, which weakens after 1989.
We report estimates for the periods 1973 to 1989 and 1990
to 2006 in tables 7 and 8, respectively. Overall, the estimates
for the years from 1973 to 1989 show a positive correlation
between structural reforms and economic performance. It is
worth noting that for the same period, the liberalization of the
electricity and telecommunications markets displays a pos-
itive and statistically significant association with economic
23 Results with alternative sets of control variables have not been reported
to save space, but they are available on request from the authors. These
controls include, among others, macropolicy variables (such as inflation),
alternative measures of educational attainment (such as primary and sec-
ondary education), alternative measures of political institutions (from the
Polity IV database), and alternative definitions of terms of trade.
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Table 7.—Reforms and Growth, 1973–1989
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.022∗∗
(0.010)
Current account (t−1) 0.051∗∗∗
(0.014)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.002
(0.012)
Network (t−1) 0.102∗∗∗
(0.014)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.053∗∗
(0.021)
Banking (t−1) 0.043∗∗
(0.020)
Securities (t−1) 0.032∗∗∗
(0.011)
Capital (t−1) 0.054∗∗∗
(0.017)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.038∗∗∗
(0.013)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.037∗∗
(0.014)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.077∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 1,313 1,599 1,452 1,695 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,599 1,599 1,599
R2 0.240 0.200 0.172 0.181 0.237 0.235 0.235 0.200 0.199 0.198
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–1989 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 8.—Reforms and Growth, 1990–2006
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.018
(0.020)
Current account (t−1) 0.039∗∗
(0.017)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.047∗∗
(0.019)
Network (t−1) 0.000
(0.014)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.124∗∗∗
(0.026)
Banking (t−1) 0.097∗∗∗
(0.024)
Securities (t−1) 0.063∗∗∗
(0.012)
Capital (t−1) 0.017
(0.014)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.018
(0.011)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.002
(0.014)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.124∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.041) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Observations 2,105 1,931 1,938 2,101 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,931 1,957 1,931
R2 0.248 0.222 0.272 0.223 0.263 0.252 0.252 0.219 0.214 0.218
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1990–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Table 9.—Reforms and Growth, Advanced Economies
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.016
(0.015)
Current account (t−1) 0.025∗∗
(0.011)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.033
(0.024)
Network (t−1) 0.002
(0.006)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.020
(0.018)
Banking (t−1) 0.010
(0.013)
Securities (t−1) 0.023∗
(0.012)
Capital (t−1) 0.017
(0.011)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.011
(0.010)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.016
(0.011)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.045∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 983 966 745 898 886 886 886 966 966 966
R2 0.326 0.333 0.402 0.358 0.351 0.348 0.362 0.329 0.328 0.329
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, authors’ estimates, and World Economic Outlook Database.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
growth, while compared with table 1, such a correlation no
longer holds for the agricultural market reforms.24
Estimates for the years from 1990 to 2006 (table 8) con-
firm the positive association between growth and all three
available indices of domestic financial sector reforms, which
we detect in both table 1 and for the period 1973 to 1989.
The evidence about openness to international trade is mixed:
only the variable that captures the (lack of) restrictions on
current account transactions maintains a positive and statis-
tically significant coefficient. When we focus on the period
1990 to 2006, reforms of the agricultural markets display, as
in table 1, a positive and statistically significant association
with economic growth. There is no significant association
between growth and reforms in the network industries (as in
table 1), and openness of the external capital account does
not display a significant correlation with economic growth—
different from the period 1973 to 1989 and the estimates in
table 1.25
We also analyze whether the association between reforms
and economic growth is heterogeneous across different
income groups. We code the countries in our sample as
24 We take the results about the network sector with a word of caution.
For the period 1973 to 1989, this variable has a value of 0 until the 75th
percentile of the distribution. Results seem to be driven by a few countries
that started opening up this sector in the period under consideration.
25 Figure 1 suggests that reforms of the network sector started around
1990, with a sharp increase in the past twenty years. Panel regressions do
not show any significant correlation between reforms of the network sector
and growth, probably because the inclusion of year fixed effects captures a
trend common to all countries in the process of reforming this sector.
advanced or emerging and developing economies, accord-
ing to the World Economic Outlook Database classification
(see appendix 1).26 Table 9 reports results for advanced
economies, while table 10 for emerging and developing
economies. As it concerns advanced economies, the indi-
cators that display a statistically significant and positive
coefficient are openness to international trade (as captured by
the lack of restrictions on the current account) and the reforms
of the securities markets. These findings are broadly consis-
tent with those concerning countries in the fourth quartile of
distance to the technological frontier (see table 2), for which
we find that reforms of the current account and the securities
sector have positive and statistically significant coefficient
estimates, which are also statistically different from those of
the other quartiles. By comparing estimates for emerging and
developing economies with those reported in table 1, we note
that the three available indicators of reforms of the capital
account no longer show a statistically significant association
with economic growth. As in table 1, reforms of the network
sector (electricity and telecommunications) display a positive
but not statistically significant coefficient estimate.
Johnson et al. (2009) warn about the implications from
estimating growth regressions with annual PPP-corrected
GDP data from the Penn World Tables due to the presence
of measurement error. We take this warning seriously, and
although we believe that for the question at hand using reform
data at an annual frequency is conceptually the preferred
26 Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata
/weoselagr.aspx.
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Table 10.—Reforms and Growth, Emerging and Developing Economies
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.021∗
(0.012)
Current account (t−1) 0.031∗∗∗
(0.010)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.015∗
(0.009)
Network (t−1) 0.010
(0.013)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.075∗∗∗
(0.020)
Banking (t−1) 0.058∗∗∗
(0.018)
Securities (t−1) 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011)
Capital (t−1) 0.016
(0.010)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.012
(0.008)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) 0.010
(0.009)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.053∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 2,432 2,564 2,645 2,898 1,767 1,767 1,767 2,564 2,590 2,564
R2 0.190 0.135 0.163 0.143 0.193 0.189 0.188 0.132 0.131 0.132
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, authors’ estimates, and IMF-World Economic Outlook Database.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
choice, we have reestimated our baseline results by using
three- and five-year interval data. As shown in table 11,
which reports estimates from using three-year interval data,
our main results are broadly robust: among the reforms that
display a positive and statistically significant coefficient esti-
mate in table 1, only the index for the liberalization of the
agricultural sector is no longer statistically significant.27
When estimating specification (1) in section IIIB, we
include one indicator of structural reform at a time. A con-
cern with these results is that the process of reforming might
involve several sectors of the economy at the same time. If
this is the case, our indicators of structural reforms are likely
to be correlated with each other.
Estimates reported in table 12 deal with this issue. The table
is organized in the following manner. Openness to interna-
tional trade is measured by the average tariff rates in columns
1 to 4, and by the restrictions on current account transactions
in columns 5 to 8. In columns 1 and 5, we consider the broader
indices of liberalization of the domestic and international
financial sectors, together with the indicators for the agricul-
tural, electricity, and telecommunication markets, which are
included in all columns, 1 to 8. We include the two subindices
of reform for the banking and securities sectors rather than the
27 When we estimate equation (1) by using five-year interval data, the fol-
lowing indices display a positive and statistical significant association with
economic growth: liberalization of the current account, the overall domestic
financial sector and its banking component, openness of the external capital
account, and its subcomponent for resident. To save space, we do not report
these results, which are available on request from the authors.
overall indicator for the domestic financial market in columns
2 and 6. We consider the openness of the capital account for
resident and nonresident rather than the general index of lib-
eralization of the external capital account in columns 3 and 7.
Finally, in columns 4 and 8, we include at the same time the
two subindices of reforms for the domestic financial sectors
(banking and securities) and the international capital account
(resident and nonresident).
By comparing these results with those reported in table
1, the indicators of openness to international trade (as mea-
sured by both average tariff rates and by the restrictions on
the current account), as well as the general index and the two
subindices of openness of the external capital account, never
display a statistically significant association with economic
growth. The coefficient estimate for the network industries
remains statistically not different from 0. Reforms in the
agricultural market and the overall domestic financial sector
instead maintain a positive and statistically significant asso-
ciation with economic growth. As it concerns specifically
the domestic financial sector, the securities market reform
displays a statistically significant and positive association
with economic growth in all the specifications in which it
is included (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8), while the positive coef-
ficient estimate for the liberalization of the banking sector is
statistically significant at conventional levels only when we
measure openness to international trade with the restrictions
imposed on the current account (columns 6 and 8).
To summarize, the results from the baseline growth regres-
sions reported in table 1 are broadly robust to GMM
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Table 11.—Reforms and Growth, Three-Year Interval Data
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−3) 0.063∗∗
(0.032)
Current account (t−3) 0.090∗∗∗
(0.027)
Agriculture (t−3) 0.020
(0.022)
Network (t−3) 0.007
(0.024)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−3) 0.108∗∗∗
(0.038)
Banking (t−3) 0.081∗∗
(0.034)
Securities (t−3) 0.070∗∗∗
(0.021)
Capital (t−3) 0.056∗∗
(0.026)
Capital (resident) (t−3) 0.040∗
(0.022)
Capital (nonresident) (t−3) 0.041∗
(0.024)
lnGDP (t−3) −0.160∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 1,110 1,166 1,119 1,259 878 878 878 1,166 1,174 1,166
R2 0.416 0.307 0.333 0.316 0.399 0.395 0.400 0.301 0.299 0.300
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Three-year interval data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in
real terms and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 12.—Growth Regressions, All Indices of Reforms
Dependent Variable:
lnGDP (t) − lnGDP (t−1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Real sector reforms
Trade (t−1) 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Current account (t−1) 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Agriculture (t−1) 0.018∗ 0.018∗ 0.018∗ 0.018∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Network (t−1) −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Financial sector reforms
Domestic finance (t−1) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Banking (t−1) 0.015 0.015 0.026∗ 0.026∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Securities (t−1) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Capital (t−1) 0.002 0.000 −0.012 −0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Capital (resident) (t−1) 0.007 0.006 −0.002 −0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital (nonresident) (t−1) −0.006 −0.008 −0.011 −0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
lnGDP (t−1) −0.036∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 2,137 2,137 2,137 2,137 2,235 2,235 2,235 2,235
R2 0.222 0.227 0.223 0.228 0.212 0.216 0.212 0.216
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2 and authors’ estimates.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. All specifications are estimated by OLS and include country and year fixed effects. Annual data over 1973–2006 when available. GDP in real terms
and PPP adjusted. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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estimation, to the inclusion of control variables, and to the use
of lower-frequency data. While for the period 1973 to 1989,
our estimates show a positive association between reforms
and growth for all our indicators of reforms with the excep-
tion of the agricultural market, the evidence is mixed for
the years after 1989. The association between reforms and
growth holds for a fairly large number of economic sectors
in the case of emerging and developing economies, while
it is limited to only the openness to international trade (as
measured by the lack of restrictions on the current account)
and the securities sector in the case of advanced economies.
Finally, when considering more than one index of reforms at
the same time, reforms in the agricultural market, the overall
domestic financial market, and the finicial market’s securities
subcomponent display a positive and statistically significant
association with a country’s economic performance.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines whether real and financial reforms
over the past three decades have been associated with higher
growth and whether there has been a differential growth
response due to a country’s institutional environment. Under-
pinning the empirical analysis is a significant data collection
effort that involves the compilation of indicators of struc-
tural reforms for a large sample of developing and developed
countries over the past three decades. Not only is the resulting
data set unique in its country and time coverage, but it is also
much broader in terms of the sectoral coverage of reforms—
as long as it includes indicators of liberalization in domestic
product markets, international trade, several indicators of lib-
eralization of the domestic financial sector, and measures of
the capital account liberalization.
Our main findings are as follows. First, illustrative growth
breaks analysis reveals a broadly positive (average) associa-
tion between real and financial reforms and growth. The first
two exercises (plotting the level of reform indices around
growth breaks and reporting growth conditional on observ-
ing liberalization upticks) show that while there is a positive
association between real and financial reforms and growth
breaks, reverse causation is also at play. The third exercise
reveals that focusing only on average reform performances
may be masking botched reforms that resulted in growth dis-
asters. The final exercise shows some evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that crises may lead to the adoption of subsequent
structural reforms.
Second, panel growth regression analysis provides evi-
dence of a broad positive association between both real
and financial sector reforms and growth. However, as in the
growth breaks analysis, also in this case the average positive
reform-growth relationship masks considerable heterogene-
ity related to a country’s constraints on the authority of the
executive power and its distance to the technology frontier.
Regarding the distance to the technological frontier, there is
no evidence of a positive relationship for countries far away
from the technology frontier. This may be because markets or
institutions in such economies are still not sufficiently devel-
oped to allow taking full advantage of substantial structural
reforms. Reforms of the current account and the securities
markets have a positive and statistically significant associa-
tion with growth for countries close to the technology frontier,
which may indicate that openness to international competi-
tion and the availability of financial instruments may favor
innovation. Perhaps one of the most interesting results is the
fact that reforms of the overall domestic financial sector and
of its banking subcomponent exhibit positive association with
growth for countries in the middle two quartiles (neither too
far from nor too close to the technology frontier). This result
may suggest that domestic financial reforms can facilitate
the financing of technology adoption in dynamic developing
economies and contribute, in this manner, to higher produc-
tivity and economic growth. The main finding, concerning
constraints on the executive power is the significant pos-
itive correlation between reforms of the overall domestic
financial and banking sectors and growth for countries with
intermediate levels of constraints on the executive authority.
This is quite an intriguing finding, as it is consistent with
the result concerning the distance to the technology fron-
tier. Taken together, these heterogeneity results suggest that
reforms are more effective when markets and institutions are
not at their infancy but at a somewhat more advanced stage
in their process of development.
We caution that our results should be taken as evidence
of strong associations rather than causation. While it is cer-
tainly the case that reforms are at least partially determined
by the political process, appropriate instrumental variables
that could resolve this and other sources of endogeneity are
particularly difficult to find. Having said that, we do not view
this as a drawback of this paper but rather a constraint inher-
ently embedded in the complex composition of structural
reforms. The heterogeneous effects that key variables—like
the broad institutional environment or the distance from the
technological frontier—have on the reform-growth relation-
ship are remarkable, and we hope that together with the novel
data set on reforms, this will stimulate further research on
this important issue. In addition, while regression results
reporting average effects are valuable exercises to obtain
broad associations, they cannot tell the whole story. As
shown in the last two exercises on growth breaks analysis in
section IIIA, there is substantial variation in reform outcomes
(including reform attempts associated with severe growth
decelerations). Therefore, regression results should be com-
plemented with more thorough and detailed event analysis.
Such direction is both intriguing and potentially fruitful.
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